Error While Injecting Dll Into Target Process 3d Analyze

If this happens during the assembly parsing phase, the PE parsing component will work on it. If it happens during the loading phase, the component will load the DLL into the process and continue to perform the analysis. In Figure 8, we see that Diztakun trojan is

targeting a given process for injection. It does not display any information about the process name or the signature of the running process. The process calls CreateProcess and also specifies that the process should start in a suspended state. If this happens during the assembly parsing phase, the PE parsing component will work on it. If it happens during the loading phase, the component will load the DLL into the process and continue to perform the analysis. In Figure 9, we see that Diztakun trojan is targeting a given process for injection. It also displays some information about the process name as well as its signature. However, the other pieces of information are somewhat misleading; for example, the entry point is labeled as being in the main function instead of the PE parsing component where the entry point is actually set. If this happens during the assembly parsing phase, the PE parsing component will work on it. If it happens during the loading phase, the component will load the DLL into the process and continue to perform the analysis. In Figure 10, we see that Diztakun trojan is targeting a given process for injection. The information displayed is only slightly misleading, mostly consisting of the name of the running process and a copy of the signature of the running process.

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As illustrated in Figure 7, using VirtualAllocEx with a size of 0 results in an unallocated memory region, probably because 0 is not a valid memory size. The malware then allocates memory by calling VirtualAllocEx with its target address as the size, and passes the address of its target process as the lpBaseAddress. The malware, after injecting its malicious code, converts the actual size of the allocated region from 32 bits to 64 bits, and encodes its data in a new region of 64 bits. This forces the malware to load from a different base address, and also helps malware avoid detection while persistence. The malware now has to load the malicious DLL into the process. As noted above, this can be done by two means: manually copying the image, or copying it using a function such as LoadLibrary. To do so, it calls VirtualAllocEx, which allocates a target address, and for reference, the CreateProcess API performs a similar function. The malware uses the pointer allocated from VirtualAllocEx to load its PE as a bootstrapping approach to patching its image and have its PE execute. Figure 8 shows the relevant interactions for Example 1: When initializing the PE image using VirtualAllocEx and LoadLibrary, the malware loops through each of the relocation table entries and calculates the address of its PE. Once this is complete, it prints the shellcode to standard out, and returns a value to the PE header. Malware in this form may also interact with the module section of the target process, and dynamically add or update its own module section or code inside of this region. 5ec8ef588b

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